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INTRODUCTION

From the moment the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
Act, popularly known as the Helms-Burton Act,' entered the 104th
Congress it sparked a great deal of controversy domestically and

*
Due to the on going debate over the Helms-Burton Act, it is important to note that this
Comment only reflects developments through September 27, 1997.
** Juris Doctor, January 31, 1998, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law
Center; B.A., April 1992, Florida International University, College of Arts and Sciences.
1. Cuban Liberty & Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-114, 110 Stat.
785 (1996) codified at 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 6021-91 (1996) [hereinafter Helms-Burton].
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internationally.2 Most of the struggle surrounding the Helms-Burton Act
centered on the far reaching provisions contained in Title III and the
adverse effects such a policy would have on United States trade allies.'
Nonetheless, with a great deal of lobbying,4 and a little luck,- this
controversial bill was signed into law by President Clinton on March 12,
1996.6 However, the struggle did not end there. Since then, the race to
pressure the Clinton administration to instill Congress to modify the Act

has intensified., From Europe, miles away, to Mexico and Canada, across
United States borders, the debacle continues. 8 Never before have so many
countries united to block the application of a United States anti-trade

sanction abroad.
This Comment explores the controversy surrounding the HelmsBurton Act and proposes that despite the stark opposition, its end is far

from becoming a reality.

The following will be the major points of

2. The degree of the controversy surrounding the Helms-Burton Act is evident from the
floor discussions presented in the Conference Report on the Cuban Liberty & Democratic
Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996. See 142 CONG. REC. H1724, H1727-04 (daily ed. Mar. 6,
1996) [hereinafter Conference Report].
3. The concern that the Helms-Burton Act would adversely effect United States trade
allies was made clear by Mr. Moakley, the gentleman from Massachusetts, in the floor debate on
House Resolution 370 where he points to the European Union's statement read on the record.
Id. at H1726. In that statement, the European Union implicitly attacks Title III of the HelmsBurton Act whereby it states: "Mhe EU objects, as a matter of principle, to those provisions
that seek to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction of United States Federal courts over disputes
between the United States and foreign companies regarding expropriated property located
overseas." Id. at H1731 (noting that Title III is the section of the Helms-Burton Act that
provides the above mentioned jurisdiction over foreign companies trafficking in the confiscated
properties).
4. Id. at H1724-04. The debate in Congress over passing the Helms-Burton Bill was so
poignant, that the President of the United States had to intervene to push its enactment. See
William J. Clinton, PresidentStatement on Cuban Liberty Act, Mar. 12, 1996, available in 1996
WL 107140.
5. Though ironic, the death of three nationals and one resident alien as a result of the
Cuban government's downing of two unarmed United States civilian aircrafts prompted the
President's signing of the Helms-Burton Act. Id.
6. Id.
7. EU Steps Up Reactions to U.S. Cuba Law, 8 EUROWATCH, US-EU RELATION,
No.11, Jul. 22, 1996 (citing European Union's threat of retaliation against the United States if
the Helms-Burton Act is implemented)[hereinafter E]. Some CanadianInvestors to be Barred
from United States, CARIBBEAN UPDATE, June 1, 1996 (noting that Canada might retaliate the
implementation of the Helms-Burton Act) outrage and threat of retaliation to the implementation
of the Helms-Burton Act) [hereinafter CanadianInvestors]. Red Herring?Mexico Defies United
States over Cuba, INT'L REP., INC., Jul. 29, 1994, available in Westlaw; News Service, IAC
File (noting Mexico's irritation and claim that the Helms-Burton violates international law)
[hereinafter Red Herring.].
8. Id.
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discussion: Part I commences with an introduction to the controversy
surrounding the Helms-Burton Act; Part II provides a background of the
events leading up to and culminating in the Helms-Burton Act's
establishment; Part III explains the controversy in light of the HelmsBurton Act's specific provisions and rebuts the numerous attacks posed to
the Helms-Burton Act's legality; Part IV delves into the struggle to bring
the Helms-Burton Act to an end; Part V discusses the Helms-Burton Act's
potential for change in light of Congress' proclaimed impediment; and Part
VI concludes with a prediction that the controversy surrounding the HelmsBurton Act is not bound to end anytime soon.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
of
On the eve new year's day of 1959, Fidel Castro took command
of Cuba and began a reign of power that has lasted over thirty-eight years.9
Before Castro, the United States played an active role in Cuban poiitics. 0
With the imposition of the Platt amendment, armed with political
interference, together with a growing presence in the island, the United
States became a significant player in Cuban politics.,, However, that role
came to a halt when the Castro regime espoused its allegiance with
2
Marxist-Lenninism, and Soviet involvement in the island increased.'
These events, together with the expropriations of all property belonging to
United States citizens and firms in the island," led to the establishment of a
comprehensive boycott against Cuba geared at strangulating its economy
4
by eliminating the island's primary source of currency and reserve.

9. See JORGE I. DOMINGUEZ, To MAKE A WORLD SAFE FOR REVOLUTION 8 (1989);
See also Trevor R. Jefferies, The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992: A Rotten Carrotand a Broken
Stick?, 16 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 75, 76 (Fall 1993).
10. See Jeffries, supra note 9, at 76. From the moment the Spaniards sunk the Maine,
United States involvement in Cuba transcended mere economics. JULES R. BENJAMIN, THE
UNITED STATES AND THE ORIGINS OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION 45 (1990). After the Spanish
defeat in 1898, the United States became the sole victor over Spanish colonialism and oppression
achieving a preferred status in the island. Id. at 61.
11. LOUIS A. PEREZ, JR., CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES: TIES OF SINGLUAR INTIMACY
XV (1990).
12. David S. De Falco, Comment, The Cuban Liberty & Democratic Solidarity (Libertad)
Act of 1996: Is the U.S. Reaching Too Far?, 3 J. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 125, 127 (Winter 1997).
13. In response to United States termination of the Cuban sugar quota, Cuba retaliated by
nationalizing the remaining all American-owned industries, agrarian enterprises and banks. See
WAYNE S. SMITH, THE CLOSEST OF ENEMIES 57 (1987).
14. See Jeffries, supra note 9, at 77. For a history of hostilities between the United States
and Cuba that culminated in the embargo's creation, see Shari Ellen Bourque, Note, The
Illegality of the Cuban Embargo in the Current InternationalSystem, 13 B.U. INT'L L. J. 191,
195-99 (1995).
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Ironically, instead of causing Castro's demise through economic strain, the
United States left a vacuum promptly filled by the Soviet Union."
Recently, with the end of the Cold War and the cessation of Soviet

6
aid, Castro turned to a different source for funds--foreign investment.'

For the past five years, Cuba has actively sought to attract foreign
investment in the island by allowing foreign ownership of land.,' With the
modification to the Cuban Constitution and the enactment of the Foreign
Investment Act, the Cuban trade market provides fewer restrictions in the
area of domestic labor or limits to foreign investment.'" As a result of the
foregoing changes, foreign investment and trade with Cuba have grown
significantly."
This latest financial strategy by the Castro regime
represents yet another challenge to the thirty-seven year old embargo.
Thus, support for the Helms-Burton Act resulted from the apparent

ineffectiveness of the embargo in light of Castro's increased financial
backing.

15. Elliot Abrams, What are Soviet Intentions in Latin America?, WALL ST. J., Aug. 18,
1989, at A7 (noting the author's estimation that the Soviet Union contributed $5-8 billion
annually to the Cuban economy).
16. See DeFalco, supra note 12, at 130.
17. Octavio Castilla, Cuba: Progress and Prospects, (visited Mar. 23, 1998)
< http://www.santafe.edu/-naninet/naminews/insert/castilla.html >.
18. Id.
19. The following excerpt(s) demonstrates the significance of foreign investment to the
Cuban economy after Soviet aid to the island ceased:
In 1993 Cuba's GDP had fallen almost 35 percent compared to that of 1989; imports were
down 75 percent. By the end of 1994, for the first time in the last five years, the negative
tendency in growth was reversed and a modest increase of .07% was obtained .... In the
first nine months of the present year GDP has grown 2.3% and, for the first time in the last
six years, so has GDP per inhabitant. As for Cuban exports in general, they grew 16% in
1994 and a similar is expected for 1995. In 1989, foreign trade was centralized in a few
dozen state enterprises. Today almost 150 national entities have export authorities, as well
as 200 economic associations of joint capital. More than 630 foreign production and trading
companies are registered to conduct activities in Cuba. Id. (noting that these figures are
pulled from an article written in 1995).
The following excerpt provides a more recent account of the foreign investment in
Cuba:
[C]anada's external trade with Cuba has grown since 1992. Imports from Cuba have
expanded from a low of around US$ 130 million in 1993 to a high of US $237 million in
1995. Also, exports to Cuba have boomed from a low of approximately US$ 100 million in
1993 to a high of US$ 203 million in 1995.
See DeFalco, supra note 12, at n.37.
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THE HELMS-BURTON ACT

The goal of the Helms-Burton Act is to promote democracy by
closing all viable economic subsistence to Cuba. The Act has three major
objectives: to encourage and finance a democratic transition government
in Cuba; to block all financial investments filtering through to the Castro
regime; and, to ensure that United States nationals receive compensation
for the expropriations conducted post-revolution in 1959.1 In addition, the
Helms-Burton Act attempts to strengthen the embargo by prohibiting
indirect financing to Cuba; 21 opposing Cuba's participation in international
financial institutions;12 and, barring assistance for the purpose of
maintaining Cuba's nuclear power plant.23 Title I of the Helms-Burton Act
includes a more extensive list of prohibitions to other countries in their
relations with Cuba23 The following is a detailed analysis of only the most
controversial provisions set forth in the Helms-Burton Act, Title's II, III,
and IV.
A. ControversialProvisions
Title II focuses on the establishment of a democratic transition
government in Cuba. This Title allows the United States to resume
diplomatic and financial relations with the island.2 It further details that
the United States will: reinstate trade, provide assistance, organize
international efforts to aid a transition, and lift the embargo, upon the
President's report announcing the existence of a transition government in
Cuba. 26 However, the most controversial section of this Title, section
207(d), 21 requires resolution of property claims in Cuba before it can be
regarded as having a democratically elect government. 2 As a result of this
section, Cuba is obligated to compensate United States citizens before it
can benefit from renewed diplomatic relations with the United States. 29
Thus, the controversy regarding this section centers on the requirement
that the United States approve of the new government, and that the new
20. Helms-Burton Act, supra note 1, §§ 101-116 (codified at 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 6031-46).
21. See id. §§ 104, 106, 108, 109, 111.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

See id. §§ 104, 106, 108, 111.
See id. § 111.
See id. §§ 110-111.
Helms-Burton Act, supra note 1, §§ 201-07 (codified at 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 6061-67).
Id.
Id. § 207(d).
Id.
Id.
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government be ready and able to comply with the pending claims made by
United States nationals for diplomatic relations to resume.
Title III of the Helms-Burton Act safeguards property claims in
Cuba by providing a civil remedy to United States nationals that possess
certified claims to property in Cuba;" and, grants these claimants a
presumption that shifts the burden of proof to the party being sued.,,
Section 302 of Title III directly affronts foreign investors by shifting the
responsibility to pay claims owed, from the Cuban government to the
companies trafficking in the confiscated property.3 2 A proper suit under
this section requires that the claims for the confiscated properties initially
be filed and certified by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission under
the International Claims Settlement Act (ICSA) of 1949.11 Only if the
suing party's property claims are certified can a suit be brought under this
section against a person, corporation, agent, or relative in the United
States.' Thus, unlike opponents to the Helms-Burton Act claim, not just
any naturalized Cuban can bring a claim for compensation for trafficking in
the confiscated property.
Incidentally, Title III also includes a loophole allowing the
President of the United States to suspend the entire Title if either a national
security interest exists or a transition government is in place in Cuba.
Section 306 gives the President the power to postpone implementation,
initially for six months. Additionally, this section allows the President to
continue suspending Title III's implementation for six-month intervals
indefinitely.3 The only requirement for the suspension is that the President
inform Congress in writing at least 15 days prior to the effective date of
the additional suspension.37 Suspensions are permitted for either the
national security interest of the United States or to expedite a transition
government in Cuba.3' While these suspensions are in effect, no property
claims can arise.3 9 However, the suspension shall not disturb pending

30. Helms-Burton Act, supra note 1, §§ 201-07.
31. Id. § 302(b)(2) (noting that the amount of liability is presumed to be the amount
certified in a lawsuit).
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
See generally Helms-Burton, supra note 1, Title II.
Id.
Helms-Burton Act, supra note 1 § 306(b)(1)(a).
Id. § 306(b)(1)(b).
Id.
Helms-Burton, supra note 1, §§ 301-06.
39. Id.
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suits.40 The President of the United States has already put this section to
good use by suspending Title III's implementation three times since the
41
Helms-Burton Act's enactment.
The other controversial provision of the Helms-Burton Act, Title
IV, focuses on the exclusion of aliens who traffic in confiscated property
from United States territory. 2 Section 401 of this Title provides grounds
for the exclusion of a person who "has confiscated or has directed or
overseen confiscation of, . . . property [whose claims are] owned by
United States national[s]"; who engage in the trafficking of confiscated
property; who is a corporate officer, "or shareholder with a controlling
interest of an entity involved in such trafficking; or who is a spouse, minor
43
child, or agent of a person excludable under" the preceding categories.
However, such exclusions may not take effect against a person who enters
the country for a medical reason or for the purpose of transferring title to
the tainted property."
Thus, Title IV excludes the families of the
traffickers as well as any person even marginally involved with the
transaction from entering the United States.

B. QuestionableLegality of the Helms-Burton Act
The legality of the Helms-Burton Act has been under attack since
its inception by those advocating to end a bad law. But, is the HelmsBurton Act really a bad law, or just a highly criticized piece of legislation
that is fully justified from the United States standpoint? The arguments
posed against the Helms-Burton Act rest on two grounds: 1) its
inconsistency with United States domestic law and 2) its violation of
international law.41 The argument under the first ground is that the HelmsBurton Act runs counter to certain agreements entered into by the United

40. Id. § 306(c)(3).
41. President Clinton continues to suspend Title III of the Helms-Burton Act to appease
United States trade allies. Carol Giacomo, Caught in Vise on Cuba, Clinton Pleases No One,
REUTERS N. AM. WiRE, Jul. 16, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, World File (noting
the first suspension of Title III); see also Urgent Clinton Announces Decision to ProlongHelmsBurton Freeze, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Jan. 3, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library,

World File (noting Clinton's second suspension of Title i1); and see Edwin D. Williamson,
Protecting Everyone's Right to Property, THE WASH. TIMEs, July 11, 1997, at A21 (noting the
third suspension of Title III of the Helms-Burton Act as a result of the United States and the
European Union's agreement on April 11 th to protect investment and inhibit future acquisition of
expropriated property).
42. Helms-Burton, supra note 1, § 401 (codified at 22 U.S.C.A. § 6091).
43. Id. § 401(a)(1)-(4).
44. Id. § 401(c).
45. See Bourque, supra note 14, at 207-11.
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States to promote free trade." The arguments under the second ground are
that the application of the Helms-Burton Act infringes on international law
because it impedes state sovereignty, represents a secondary boycott, and
is wholly unjustified.4 7 These arguments, though justly made, fail to
account for the United States' justifications." The following paragraphs
question the validity of the arguments advanced above in light of those
justifications.

1. Inconsistency with Domestic Law?
The Helms-Burton Act ostensibly violates certain multilateral
agreements to which the United States is a party; geared at promoting free
trade in the international sphere. Among the most notable of these
agreements are: the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 9 Both of these
agreements are often used by opponents of anti-trade legislation to point
out the United States' incapacity in creating laws such as the Helms-Burton
Act." However, these can only provide a cause of action domestically if
they are self-executing or have implementing legislation.'
Here, both
2
Agreements have been implemented through Fast Track, though not
entirely. 3 Thus, both Agreements provide viable avenues through which
member countries can attack the legality of the Helms-Burton Act.
NAFTA or World Trade Organization member countries could, in
dispute settlement resolution proceedings, argue that the Helms-Burton Act
violates some of the provisions in either NAFTA or GATT.4 The
46. See generally infra note 49 (citing GATT & NAFTA as possible avenues to further a
domestic attack against the Helms-Burton Act).
47.

U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para 7.

48.

See infra Part III B(2)(c).

49. The North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S.,

32

I.L.M. 296, 297-456 & 605-800 [hereinafter NAFTA], General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT
1947].
50. Anthony M. Solis, Comment, The Long Arm of U.S. Law: The Helms-Burton Act, 19
LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 709, 732-36 (Apr. 1997).
51. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES § 111 (1985)
[hereinafter THIRD § 111].
52. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101, 2111-12, 2191-93 (1988), reprinted in Samuel C. Straight,
Note, GATT and NAFTA: Marrying Effective Dispute Settlement and the Sovereignty of the Fifty
States, 45 DUKE L.J. 216, n.121 (Oct. 1995) (noting that Fast Track is utilized to implement
international agreements as needed).
53. Id.

54. NAFTA, supra note 49 art. 1105(I); see also Kenneth L. Bachman, Anti-Cuban
Sanctions May Violate NAFTA, GAYT, NAT'L L. J.C3 (Mar. 11, 1996)[hereinafter Bachman].
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following are just some of the arguments advanced under either trade
agreement." First, a NAFTA member country can argue that Title III of
the Helms-Burton Act contradicts NAFTA article 1105, which requires
that a NAFTA country abide by international law when dealing with the
investment of a NAFTA country national.16 Additionally, a NAFTA
member country could also argue that Title III of the Helms-Burton Act
infringes article 1105 because it lacks the justification to exercise
jurisdiction over foreign activity wholly unconnected to the United States. 5
Likewise, under GATT, a World Trade Organization member can argue
that the Helms-Burton Act impermissibly burdens freedom of trade.-"
Thus, the above mentioned provisions provide viable arguments against the
Helms-Burton Act.
The problem with these arguments is that the agreements from
which they were taken provide exceptions to their application. These
agreements allow member countries to withdraw a dispute or simply not
abide by the agreement in the interest of national security, and in the
interest of preserving sovereignty.59 That is, the United States need not
uphold its commitment to either document, where a national security
interest in not doing so exists. Though many would disagree,60 the United
States continues to brand the Cuban government as a threat to national
security.61 The United States justifies its claim of national security against
55. There are other avenues for attack under NAFTA and/or GATlr which have been
recently explored. The following is a brief recapitulation of those arguments: first, under
NAFTA, a member country can argue that the Act maintains a prohibition or restriction on the
importation of a foreign good that touched Cuban soil in violation of article 309(1); second,
under GATT, a member country can argue that the Act violates Articles I;III, V, XI, and XII
because it interferes with a foreign company's sourcing of raw materials; but more specifically,
under GATT, a member country can argue that the Helms-Burton discriminates against 'like
products' in violation of article 1 (1). See Brian J.Welke, Comment, GAIT and NAFTA v. The
Helms-Burton Act: Has the United States Violated MultilateralAgreements?, 4 TULSA J. COMP.
& INT'L L. 361, 366-9 (Spring 1997).
56. See Bachman, supra note 54, at C3.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. The so called national security exception for NAFTA is located in Chapter 21, Article
2102 which states that: "[n]othing in this Agreement shall be construed ... to prevent any party
from taking any actions that it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security
interests ...

taken [for an] emergency in international relations .

. . ."

See Welke, supra note

55, at n. 99. NAFTA's counterpart, GATr, has a similar provision in Article XXI. Id. at 376.
60. See ADOLFO LEYVA DE VARONA, Ph.D., PROPAGANDA AND REALITY: A LOOK AT
THE U.S. EMBARGO AGAINST CASTRO'S CUBA (Canf 1994) [hereinafter PROPAGANDA] (noting

the author's response to the argument that Cuba fails to present a national security threat to the
United States).
61. Id.
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Cuba on the following: 1) their antagonistic history; 2) their geographic
proximity; and 3) their pending economic interests.2 Since the above
mentioned agreements do not define national security, the use of this
exception leaves the door wide open for its continual use to evade their
provisions." Thus, the United States application of the Helms-Burton Act
is not inconsistent with domestic law.
2. Invalidity Internationally?
International criticism against the Helms-Burton Act revolves
around the following three arguments: first, that the Helms-Burton Act
interferes with state sovereignty; second, that the Helms-Burton Act
represents an impermissible secondary boycott against United States trade
allies; and third, that the United States has no justification to implement the
Helms-Burton Act to actions occurring outside its borders.6 Although the
above arguments seem compelling at first glance, they are fundamentally
flawed because they insist on disregarding the United States' position on
Cuba from its analysis. For that reason, the following paragraphs will
explicate the validity of the above mentioned arguments in light of the
United States' justifications in pursuing implementation of the HelmsBurton Act.
a. Interference with State Sovereignty
The first argument against the international invalidity of the
Helms-Burton Act rests on its alleged interference on state sovereignty.
The concept of sovereignty is memorialized under article 2(4) of the
United Nations Charter which states that: "All Members shall refrain in
their international relations from the threat or the use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." ' Other than a
'threat' or a 'use of force,' a state victim of a violation of an international
obligation by another state may use unilateral measures, though unlawful,
only where: necessary to end the violation or the injury, or to remedy the

62.

CARLOS ALZUGARAY TRETO, PROBLEMS OF NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE CUBAN-

U.S. HISTORIC BREACH, IN U.S.-CUBAN RELATIONS IN THE 1990'S, 90-93 (Westview Press

1989) (citing to the numerous national security themes that shaped the United States and Cuban
conflict); see also PROPAGANDA, supra note 60 (noting the current United States national
security concerns in Cuba).
63. See Welke, supra note 59, at 376.
64. W. Fletcher Fairey, Comment, The Helms-Burton Act: The Effect of International
Law on Domestic Implementation, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1289, 1312-21 (Apr. 1997).
65. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4).

Pifia

1998]

1269

violation; and proportional to the violation and the injury suffered."6 Since,
the Helms-Burton Act represents neither a 'threat' nor a 'use of force,' the
international validity of its application rests solely on the necessity and
proportionality of said measure to the injury.67 Thus, whether the HelmsBurton Act's interference on state sovereignty violates international law
depends on the magnitude of the injury suffered by the United States.
United States nationals suffered serious financial loss as a result of
the Cuban nationalizations in 1960.61 Under international law, a state is
responsible for any injury resulting from a taking of property owned by a
national of another state, unless: it is taken for a public purpose; is not
discriminatory; or is accompanied by just compensation. 6 Cuba arbitrarily
confiscated property owned by United States nationals without providing
just compensation in violation of international law.70 Although the
confiscations provided for payment to the aggrieved parties, the terms of
payment have never been fulfilled by the Castro regime." Moreover, the
properties were not taken for a public purpose because the record shows
Castro's intent to expropriate was to affront the United States.7 Since
Cuba continues to owe an international obligation to United States
nationals, unilateral measures from the United States are permissible to
remedy the injury or violation." Thus, in light of the facts, the minimal
interference with state sovereignty, if any, caused by the Helms-Burton
Act is permissible under international law.

66.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES §905 (1)(a-b),

(2), cmt. a (1987).

67. Id.
68.

"When Castro nationalized Cuba in 1960, several U.S. companies were forced out.

At the time, the United States was doing more than $500 million in business with Cuba (about
$2.5 billion in 1994 dollars)." Cuba Scouting for Investors, USA TODAY, Dec. 27, 1994, at 6B.
The following United States' companies lost millions: International Telephone and Telegraph
$131, Moa Bay Mining $88.3, American Sugar $71.6, Texaco $51.0, Bangor Punta $39.2,
Nicaro Nickel $33.0, Coca-Cola $27.5, Lone Star Cement $24.8, Colgate-Palmolive $14.4, etc.
Id. The value of the claims registered with the United States Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission is $1,851,057,358 (at a present compensable value of $13,051,845,500). John
Smagula, Redirecting Focus: Justifying the U.S. Embargo Against Cuba and Resolving the
Stalemate, 21 N.C.J. INT'L & COM. REG. 66, 68 (Fall 1995).
69. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES §712 (1987)
[hereinafter THIRD § 712].
70. See Smagula, supra note 68, at 72-74.
71. Id. at note 55 (noting that the Castro regime's actions at the time demonstrated its lack
of intent toward providing compensation for the expropriated properties).
72. Id.
73. Id.
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b. A Secondary Boycott on U.S. Trade Allies
The second argument against the Helms-Burton Act internationally
is that it simulates an impermissible secondary boycott on United States
trade allies. To determine the validity of this argument, the query turns to
the strict definition of a secondary boycott taken from federal labor law.
"A secondary boycott is any combination [of acts] if its purpose and effect
are to coerce customers or patrons, or through fear or loss ... to withhold
or withdraw their business relations from [an] employer under attack. "14 In
comparing the above definition to the Helms-Burton Act, there is merit to
the argument that said Act 'in intent and probably in effect' is a classical
secondary boycott." The validity of said argument stems from the HelmsBurton Act's stated purpose aimed at discouraging foreign investment in
76
Cuba by threatening to subject investors to litigation in the United States.
However, by virtue of the above mentioned definition, the Helms-Burton
Act does not operate as a secondary boycott because it does not directly
coerce foreign investors outright from doing business with Cuba." Since
the Title III merely discourages foreign investment in the island, the
argument that the Helms-Burton Act is a secondary boycott on United
States trade allies is likewise unconvincing.
c. Lack of Jurisdictionand Reasonableness
The last argument against the Helms-Burton Act, discussed here,
is that its extraterritorial jurisdiction is wholly unjustified and, in the
alternative, unreasonable under international law. Title III of the HelmsBurton Act is United States law geared at proscribing foreign investment in
Cuba. In order for the United States to exercise jurisdiction over acts of
non-nationals outside its territory, it must first be justified to do so under
international law. 8 Since the conduct proscribed by the Helms-Burton Act

74. Wright v. Teamsters' Union Local No.690, 33 Wash. 2d 905, 207 P.2d 662, 665
(1949). The term refers to refusal to work for, purchase from or handle products of an employer
with whom the union has no dispute with object of forcing that employer to stop doing business
with another employer with whom union does have a dispute. C. Cornelia, Inc. v. United Farm
Workers Organizing Committee, 33 Ohio App. 2d 61, 292 N.E.2d 647, 656 (1976).
75. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Congress and Cuba: The Helms-Burton Act, 90 AM. J. INT'L
L. 419, 429 (July 1996).
76. See generally Helms-Burton, supra note 1, Title III.
77. See Lowenfeld, supra note 75, at 430. But, even if Title III of the Helms-Burton Act
represented a secondary boycott on United States Trade allies, such would not be a per se
violation of international law. See Fairey, supra note 64, at 1314.
78. International law recognizes five basis for prescriptive jurisdiction: nationality,
territoriality, universality, protective principle and passive personality. RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES §402, cmt. a (1987).
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occurs outside United States territory by non-nationals, neither the
territoriality, nor the nationality principles can provide a valid
justification. 9 However, section 402 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations provides one justification that allows prescription of conduct of
non-nationals outside United States borders, where said conduct has direct
effects inside the United States--the direct effects doctrine. 0 With regards
to the Helms-Burton Act, the fact that non-nationals are trafficking in the
confiscated properties has intentional and substantial effects on United
States nationals who possess claims to those properties within the United
States.81 Thus, the prescriptive jurisdiction of the Helms-Burton Act is
justified.
However, "[e]ven when one of the bases for jurisdiction under
§402 is present, a state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law...
when the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable."8 2 Although critics
argue that the Helms-Burton Act will not meet any of the reasonableness
factors, the following arguments demonstrate the contrary.83 First, there
are substantial economic connections between the United States and the
traffickers, to wit--the tainted property.8 ' Second, implementation of the
Helms-Burton Act to stop foreign investment in the island is necessary to
protect U.S. nationals' property claims.85 Third, the Helms-Burton Act is
important to the international system in that it aids in terminating the last
79. Id. at cmt(s) c & e.
80. Id. at cmt. d.
81. See DeFalco, supra note 12.
82. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES § 403(1)
(1987). The factors used to determine reasonableness of prescriptive jurisdiction are:
a. the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state;
b. the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity between the
regulating state and the individuals regulated;
c.
the character of the activity to be regulated;
d. the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the regulation;
e.
the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or economic
system;
f.
the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the international
system;
g. the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity; and
h. the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
Id. at (2)(a-h) , cmt b. (noting that not all factors are given the same importance in all
situations).
83. See Fairey, supra note, 64 at 1318.
84. RESTATEMENT, supra note 82, § 403 (2)(b).
85. Id.§ (2)(c).
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bastion of communism in the Western world." Fourth, implementation of
the Helms-Burton Act is consistent with the international tradition, which
permit unilateral measures to counteract the breach of an international
obligation.7 Lastly, no other state is interested in regulating foreign
investment in Cuba other than the United States." Thus, the Helms-Burton
Act does not inhere international requirements for the valid exercise of
jurisdiction abroad.

IV. TRADE WAR LOOMING?
Vestiges of the controversy that would befall the Helms-Burton Act
were evident since the Helms-Burton Act's presentment in Congress."
However, the best record of the stark opposition to the Helms-Burton Act
appears in the Congressional Record of the floor debates on House
Resolution 370.90 The arguments posed against the Helms-Burton Act
therein include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) Castro will not
be hurt by this legislation; (2) the Helms-Burton Act weakens the United
States ability to encourage democracy in Cuba; (3) the economic embargo
against Cuba will not hasten the end of the Castro regime; (4) there is no
indication that the Cuban economy is on the brink of collapse; (5) the
Helms-Burton Act denies the President the flexibility to respond to a
democratic transition in Cuba; (6) the Helms-Burton Act coerces United
States trade allies to join in the Cuban embargo at the risk of retaliation;
and (7) the Helms-Burton Act subverts United States national interest for a
select few. 91 While these arguments failed to block the Helms-Burton Act's
enactment, they set the stage for the struggle to end the Helms-Burton Act
in a different forum--the international arena.
A. Waging an InternationalTrade War
Scholars predict that a different threat, not involving the military
or saving human lives, grows near: an international trade war.' The cause
of this new form of engagement is not oppression, communism, or
freedom; but, rather a United States law sought to proscribe the conduct of

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. § (2)(e).
Id. § (2)(f).
Id. § (2)(g).
See Bill Tracking, H.R. 927, Oct. 16, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library.
See Conference Report, supra note 2, at H1725.
Id.
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non-nationals outside United States borders called the Helms-Burton Act.92
Although application of said law to conduct outside United States territory
is not inconsistent with international law,91 the affected countries are
likewise permitted to use unilateral measures to counteract the HelmsBurton Act's unruly provisions." These measures, if taken, could have
numerous repercussions on trade relations between the United States and
up to seventeen countries in the world (including Canada and Mexico)."
One aspect of the potential repercussions involving the seven most
industrialized countries in the world as a result of the Helms-Burton Act,
has already taken hold by virtue of the threats announced by Canada, the
European Union and Mexico.' 6 Thus, it is to the effectiveness of these
threats that this paper turns to next.
B. Threatened Sanctionsfrom Canada, EU, and Mexico
Enactment of the controversial Helms-Burton Act sparked serious
criticism. Chief among the protesters are Canada, Mexico, and the
European Union, whose corporate citizens, incidentally, are the major
traffickers in the tainted property.Y7 These governments have denounced
the Helms-Burton Act as being an invalid use of extraterritorial jurisdiction
and as launching a direct attack at their nations' sovereignty."
Consequently, these countries have launched a concerted attack against the
Helms-Burton Act to prevent its implementation." The question here
becomes, whether the pressure from these countries, in and of itself, is
sufficient to compel the United States to modify and/or amend the HelmsBurton Act to exclude the controversial provisions delineated in Part III
above. In answering the above query, however; a threshold analysis into
each country's plan of attack against the Helms-Burton Act is merited.

92. Antonio Paneque Brizuelas, 1Se aboca el mundo hacia una guerra comercial?,
GRANMA INT'L (visited July 25, 1995) <http://www.cubanet.cu/granma/j unio/4junle.html >.

93. See supra Part III(B)(2)(c).
94. See supra Part III(B)(2)(a) (noting the same analysis applies to the retaliating countries
since the Helms-Burton Act, if implemented, will injure their respective citizens alike).
95. See Brizuelas, supra note 92.
96. See generally EU, supra note 7; see CanadianInvestors, supra note 7; and also, Red
Herring?, supra note 7.
97. See generally Conference Report, supra note 2 at H1724-04.
98. Id. at H1730.
99. See generally EU, supra note 7; see CanadianInvestors, supra note 7; Red Herring?,
supra note 7.
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1. Canada
Canada, Cuba's largest foreign investor, vigorously opposed the
Helms-Burton Act from its inception. ' ®
0 In the interest of protecting its
corporate citizens, Canada drafted and introduced a bill to counteract the
Helms-Burton Act's implementation." °0

Canada's Trade Minister, Art

Eggleton, described the Canadian bill as 'antidote legislation."2 The
Canadian bill strikes back at the United States anti-trade legislation by
providing the following measures: refusing to recognize the HelmsBurton; ignoring any court rulings issued in accordance with the HelmsBurton Act; allowing Canadian firms to countersue Canadian subsidiaries
of American firms; and allowing the Canadian government to fine
Canadian firms that succumb to the Helms-Burton Act's provisions. 03 As
Mr. Eggleton repeats the threat he advises: "If the President of the United
States does not proceed with the implementation of the Helms-Burton Act,
then our companies won't need this...

."1

Thus, at this venture,

Canada's threats do not seem at all vain.
2. European Union
The European Union, on the other hand, has encountered more
difficulty in moving up to speed in introducing an 'antidote' to the HelmsBurton Act like their Canadian counterparts. The only draft for an antiboycott measure against United States extraterritorial sanctions, such as the
Helms-Burton Act, failed to pass the Council of Ministers last October.' °
The regulation was unable to procure a unanimous approval from the
member states.' °0 The most recent measure taken by the European Union,
in conjunction with Canada and Mexico, is to file a complaint in the World
Trade Organization to set up a dispute settlement panel to discuss
violations to GATT and NAFTA by the Helms-Burton Act. 1w After a
previous rejection, the United States accepted the creation of a panel to

100. Canada Introduces Anti Helms-Burton Legislation, REUTERS FIN. SERV. (Sept. 16,
1996) [hereinafter Canadian Bill]; Bill Would Protect Firms From Helms-Burton Law, THE
RECORD, Sept. 17, 1996, at B08.
101. CanadianBill, supra note 100.
102. Id.
103. d.
104. Id.
105. EU/US: Commission Plays Down Danish Snag on Anti Helms-Burton Move, EUR.
INFO. SERV. (Oct. 27, 1996).
106. Id.
107. See infra note 114.
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investigate the legality of the Helms-Burton Act.Im Thus, the European
Union is also a strong contender to the Helms-Burton Act and any sanction
implemented by the Council of Ministers will not be taken lightly.
3. Mexico
Of the three opponents to Helms-Burton Act, Mexico is the
weakest and least involved. The most Mexico has done, besides making
several denunciations, is to participate in the complaint to the World Trade
Organization with Canada and the European Union.""9 Although Mexico
has not been actively involved in creating an 'antidote' to the HelmsBurton Act, it is an avid supporter of the Cuban theme in the Organization
of American States (OAS)." 0 In the last OAS convention on June 5, 1996,
every member, except the United States, voted on a resolution to submit
the Helms-Burton Act to a judicial committee to determine its validity in
international law.", Other than Mexico's participation in the latter two
events, the Mexican government has done nothing more than ride on the
coattails of Canada and the European Union."12 Furthermore, Mexico has
never directly attacked the United States or threatened to retaliate, other
than protest the illegality of the Helms-Burton Act."13 Thus, Mexico
remains the 'jack in the box' as to precisely what measures, if any, it will
employ against the Helms-Burton Act.
V. DUBIOUS U.S. COMPROMISE TO CHANGE THE ACT
The magnitude of the controversy surrounding the Helms-Burton
Act does not end with each of the foregoing countries' individual plan(s)
for retaliation. As discussed supra Part III(B)(1), there are other concerted
measures that can achieve more effective results such as instituting a World
Trade Organization (WTO) complaint against the Helms-Burton Act.'
Both Canada and the European Union have actively sought to attack the

108. See Solis, supra note 50, at 734.
109. William Willits, Mexico's Zedillo Denounces U.S. Anti-Cuban Sanctions, LATINO
LINK (June 11, 1996); David Perez, Mexico, Canada Prep to Defy Helms-Burton, WORKERS
WORLD NEWS SERV. (Jun. 27, 1996).
110. Fernando Martinez, Reves en la OEA a la Helnu-Burton, LA JORNADA, June 5, 1996.
111. OAS Condemns Helms-Burton, LATIN AM. LAW AND BUS. REP. (June 30, 1996)
(noting 32 out of 34 votes in favor--only the United States voted against the resolution, the
Dominican Republic was not present in the vote).
112. See Willits, supra note 109.
113. Id.
114. Canada To Support EU in WTO Panel on Helms-Burton, REUTERS FIN. SERV. (Nov.
21, 1996).
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validity of the Helms-Burton Act beyond its territorial boundaries in
dispute settlement proceedings before the WTO.1'1 This latter measure has
already proven its effectiveness in light of recent pronouncements made by
the United States in lieu of the proceedings.1 6
However, those
pronouncements are suspect, at best, in light of Congress' impediment to
changing the controversial provisions of the Helms-Burton Act."' Thus, to
assess the validity of the United States commitment to the European Union,
a look into the legislation currently proposed in Congress to the Helms-

Burton Act is essential.
Irrespective of the agreement between the European Union and the

United States to suspend the WTO hearings,

the Foreign Affairs

Committee of the House of Representatives of the United States Congress
continues to support legislation aimed at reinforcing the blockade against

Cuba."' Most of the bills Congress passed this past legislative session are
additions and/or modifications to the Helms-Burton Act, aimed at
preempting renewed efforts at debilitating the Act.1" The subversive
nature of the Committee's actions in passing these bills is evident in the
secrecy with which they were carried out; their continued imposition on

115. Id.
116. EU and U.S. Reach Deal on Helms-Burton, WORLD NEWS DIG. (Apr. 17, 1997)
(noting the Clinton administration's promise to seek a change in Helms-Burton that allows the
President to waive Title IV, in return for the suspension of the WTO hearing and the European
Union's commitment to deter European companies from dealing in the tainted properties).
117. Id. As Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-Florida) clearly stated, in reaction to
the April 11 accord between the European Union and the United States, "any attempt to change
Helms-Burton 'would be met with stiff resistance in Congress.'" Id.
118. The following legislation passed the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of
Representatives on May 6, 1997 amending the Foreign Policy Reform Act to include:
1. Sec. 308: Withholding U.S, assistance to countries that aid the government of Cuba
2. Sec. 506: Availability of funds for the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(Liberty) Act of 1996 and the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992
3. Sec. 513: Requirements for assistance to the Russian Federation
4. Sec. 577: Withholding of assistance to countries that provide nuclear fuel to Cuba
5. Sec. 705: Assistance to human rights groups in Cuba
6. Sec. 1106: United States Informational, Educational and Cultural Programs
7. Sec. 1261 Reports to Congress concerning Cuban immigration policies
8. See. 1412: Authorities of the Broadcasting Board of Governors
9. Sec. 1705: Reports on determinations under Title IV of the Liberty Act
10. Sec. 1709: Programs or projects of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Cuba
Denunciation of new actions against Cuba in the United States Congress, GRANMA
INT'L, Aug. 21, 1997.
119. Id.
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the administration to submit periodic reports on its policy toward Cuba; the
obvious contradiction to the United States' promise to the European Union
to relax the Helms-Burton Act; and the obvious impediment posed by
supporters of the Helms-Burton Act to change.' 2 The ulterior motive
behind the passage of these bills is to heighten Washington's offensive
toward Cuba by granting Congress increased decision-making over United
States foreign policy with Cuba.' 2' If successful, these actions will
undercut any effort by the Clinton administration to relax the controversial
Thus, in light of Congress'
provisions of the Helms-Burton Act.'2
impediment to change, it is unlikely that the United States will be capable
of keeping its promise to the European Union.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In sum, the outcome of the foregoing analysis is that despite the
controversy surrounding the Helms-Burton Act, its end is far from
becoming a reality. While the Clinton administration's promise to the
European Union in lieu of the WTO hearings seemed hopeful, it did not
account for the strong forces in Congress that viciously seek an end to the
Castro regime at all cost. More than likely, when the d6tente between the
European Union and the United States comes due, the Clinton
administration will arrive empty-handed to the bargaining table. And then
what? Will Title III of the Helms-Burton Act ever get implemented? Will
the European Union go forward with its WTO complaint? Will there be a
trade war?
These are questions to which only time can provide answers.
However, the record as presented here strongly suggests that all but the
last question will be answered in the negative. As long as the President
possesses the power to suspend Title III every six months indefinitely, it is
unlikely that the Helms-Burton Act will ever go into effect. Furthermore,
with regards to the European Union and its WTO complaint, there is little
chance that such a measure will succeed in bringing an end to the HelmsBurton Act's controversial provisions. Moreover, the chances of the
European Union, and the border nations of Mexico and Canada, instigating
a commercial trade war against the United States, is slim at best
considering that the American people consume a large part of these
nations' exports; and a trade war against the United States would certainly
backfire on the instigators (considering that said measures would hurt them

120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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more). In closing, however, one thing is clear, there is no telling what
will happen to the Helms-Burton Act next.

